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Bridges and Bonds: List Proportional 
Representation (PR) and Campaigning 






It is argued in this paper that the list proportional representation (PR) electoral 
system encourages parties to campaign using racially divisive themes in South 
Africa. A content analysis of party campaigning in 1994 and 1999 demonstrates 
the extent to which the various parties espoused messages that sought to 
mobilise groups on the basis of their race. A comparison of the main parties 
indicates that those parties that invoke exclusive ‘us and them’ messages do 
better than those that attempt an inclusive ‘catch-all’ strategy. The list PR 
electoral system is identified as the key explanatory variable for this 
phenomenon. List PR encourages the growth of a centrifugal party system where 
parties aim to racially ‘outbid’ each other for the votes of the groups they 
purport to represent. In such a system, parties that ‘bond’ with the social 
cleavage they represent are rewarded, while those that attempt to ‘bridge’ 
historical divisions are punished. It is suggested that over time, parties will 
‘learn’ that the most successful means of mobilising voters is to play on the fears 
and aspirations associated with their race, with potentially disastrous 





1. Theoretical Background 
 
The debate within the constitutional engineering school between Horowitz and 
Lijphart presents us with two competing views of the best electoral systems to 
attenuate racial and ethnic conflict in divided societies. Lijphart and more 
recently, Reynolds, have argued that list PR is the most suitable electoral system 
for a divided society chiefly on the grounds that it allows for minority 
representation in the legislature (Lijphart and Grofman, 1984: 7; Lijphart, 1987: 
5; 1990: 6; 1991: 72; Reynolds, 1995; 1997; 1999). It is claimed that the 
inclusivity of list PR means that fewer groups are likely to resort to anti-system 
measures, thus aiding the consolidation of democracy.  
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Secondly, Reynolds argues that list PR encourages parties to create ethnically 
diverse lists, resulting in few incentives for candidates to make ethnically 
exclusive appeals for support (1999: 97). Elsewhere (1997) he points out that the 
national lists in the South African 1994 election allowed parties to present 
ethnically heterogeneous groups of candidates with cross-cutting appeal. 
However, party lists in South Africa have not been as diverse as suggested by 
Reynolds. Parties are routinely criticized for having homogeneous lists and in 
many instances where members from across the racial divide are included, it is a 
result of tokenism1 or of the personal politics of a particular MP2, rather than a 
reflection of a party's commitment to racial accommodation. In any event, there 
is no reason why a black ANC candidate, for example, would have less 
incentive to make racially exclusive appeals when campaigning in African 
townships just because a few whites were included on the ANC’s party list. 
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Peter Mokaba, for instance, have become 
notorious for their racially inflammatory statements on the campaign trail.3 
Furthermore, few voters are aware of the demographics of the party lists, aside 
from the party leadership. Extra-parliamentary movements during apartheid 
(ANC, PAC and IFP) all have black leaders at the helm, while those that 
engaged in, and have their roots in, apartheid structures (NP, DP and FF) are all 
led by whites.  
 
Thirdly, it is claimed by the consociational school that the fragmentation of the 
party system allowed by PR makes it likely that parties will need to form 
coalitions across racial lines in order to achieve their electoral objectives, 
thereby furthering inter-racial co-operation (Lijphart, 1987: 5). The assertion 
that list PR leads to multi-ethnic governing coalitions is however tenuous, as list 
PR on its own does not guarantee sufficient party proliferation to necessitate a 
governing coalition (Horowitz, 1991: 173; Deschouwer and Jans, 1998: 183). In 
a country where one party obtains more than half of the national vote, it can 
govern alone, whatever electoral system is in place.4 Furthermore, if no clear 
winner emerges from an election, the resulting coalition or ‘seat pooling’ 
arrangement is likely to fall apart as there is no incentive to compromise over 
ethnic or racial issues (Horowitz, 1991: 171).  
 
                                                          
1 David Malatsi’s position as an NNP candidate in 1999, for instance.  
2 Joe Slovo, for example, was hardly elected on to the ANC list to placate white fears.  
3 Mokaba was responsible for popularizing the slogan: “Kill the farmer, kill the boer.” 
Madikizela-Mandela told black voters in 1999 that white farmers were killing each other to 
provoke retaliatory attacks on blacks (Sowetan, March 23 1999). 
4 In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) garnered 62% and 65% in the 
1994 and 1999 elections respectively. The constitutionally mandated power-sharing 
government fell apart after two years and there is no provision for a governing coalition in the 
Final Constitution. The presence of the IFP in the national cabinet is a trade off for ANC 
seats in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial executive. 
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Horowitz proposes the alternative vote (AV) electoral system to encourage 
parties to form alliances before the election takes place. The AV electoral 
system uses a preferential ballot and voters are asked to rank-order their 
preferred candidates. Under this system, parties are reliant on each other for 
electoral support, forcing them to adopt moderate policy stances and campaign 
messages. The parties that are the most moderate on ethnic and racial issues are 
likely to pick up the most support since they will be rewarded by securing the 
most second preferences of voters. As Horowitz puts it: ‘Voters of one group 
could provide the margin of victory for a candidate of another group, who might 
then be responsive to their concerns.’ (1991: 173) These preferential systems 
thus have a very different incentive structure to list PR systems where incentives 
to appeal to voters of other racial and ethnic groups are absent and voters are 
‘locked wholly within their ethnic party’ (Horowitz, 1991: 172). 
 
While it is true that the inclusiveness of list PR is desirable in a divided society, 
it is important for constitutional engineers to look beyond the effect that the 
electoral system has on the composition of the legislature. This is especially 
important in a dominant party system such as South Africa, where one party is 
able to govern without the need of forming a coalition across racial lines.   
 
Party campaigning and the message that politicians send out to the electorate 
play an important role in a divided society. As Schrire notes: 
 
'In fragile democracies, both the ruling and opposition parties may 
have the capacity to destroy democracy itself. Thus both the balance 
of political forces and the respective party strategies will be critical 
in shaping political developments' (2001: 27). 
 
In a society where politics is largely segmented along racial lines, party 
strategies that entrench division along existing conflictual cleavages have an 
inimical effect on democracy. Parties playing the race card to cement their 
support base, seriously hinder the ability of new democracies to overcome 
historical divisions. If these divisions are not surmounted, then politics is likely 
to take on a zero sum character whereby one group is seen to rule at the expense 
of others. It is therefore imperative that measures are adopted that counteract the 
tendency for politicians to play the race card. The only way to achieve this is to 
promote the development of inclusive or ‘catch-all’ parties that do not direct 
their electoral appeals at some groups at the expense of others. 
 
Lijphart’s primordial view of race and ethnicity means that he accepts racial 
mobilisation as an inevitable and permanent feature of a divided society (1977: 
4-5; 1987: 5). Instead of devising means of diminishing the salience of 
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ascriptive identities, he is satisfied with proposing a system that encourages 
many parties (defined along ethnic lines) to be represented in the legislature.5  
 
A constructivist approach to ethnicity on the other hand allows us to propose 
measures that may counteract the tendency of parties to sound racially divisive 
themes. Whereas primordialists hold that ethnicity is a given from birth and thus 
immutable (Geertz, 1963: 109), constructivists argue that ethnic identities are 
imagined or constructed. Ethnic or racial boundaries are formed as groups ‘seek 
to defend their interests or increase their advantages by restricting recruitment 
and access to membership of the group’ (Schlemmer, 1999: 33). In other words, 
a key reason for the persistence of race as a salient factor in politics is due to the 
messages of political elites who seek to meet their electoral goals.  
 
If political affiliations in a divided society are constructed, they have the 
potential to become fluid. In this case, an electoral system must, if possible, 
encourage this fluidity by creating incentives for politicians to seek support 
across racial lines. This is what Horowitz believes AV will achieve in a divided 
society.6  
 
Evidence from countries that use the AV and another preferential voting system, 
the single transferable vote (STV) is encouraging. Architects of the 1997 
Constitution in Fiji sought ‘constitutional arrangements [to] promote the 
emergence of multi-ethnic governments’ (Lal, 1999: 276) in order to overcome 
the country’s history of ethnic division between the indigenous Fijians and Indo-
Fijians. Following the proposal of Horowitz,7 the AV system was used for the 
1999 election. Reilly notes that political parties from both sides of the ethnic 
divide reacted to the changed incentives by making pre-election alliances with 
the election being fought between two large multi-ethnic coalitions rather than 
between monoethnic parties as in the past (Reilly, 2002a: 163). As a result, the 
election campaign was the first in Fiji’s history not to be dominated by race. Lal 
referred to the election as:  
 
'…the most relaxed in living memory. Trading preferences with other 
parties dampened what would have been a fiery campaign. For once, 
                                                          
5 This view has led Lijphart to develop his consociational package of which PR is an integral 
component. The other consociational institutions are segmental autonomy, grand coalition 
and   mutual veto in the executive. However, even without the other consociational 
measures, he recommends PR as the best electoral system for a divided society. 
6 Note: Horowitz is not an ethnic primordialist although he is often wrongly associated with 
this position. Horowitz argues that politicians play a key role in creating ethnic conflict and 
that a shift in context or institutional change may create new identities (1985: 291; 1991: 44, 
47). See Du Toit (1999) for an exposition of the view that Horowitz is not a primordialist. 
7 Horowitz served as a consultant to the Fijian Constitution Review Commission. (Horowitz, 
1999: 24) 
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race was relegated to the background because both coalitions were 
multiracial' (Lal cited in Reilly, 2001: 143). 
 
Unfortunately, a coup resulted in military rule being restored in Fiji in May 
2000, in large part due to the imbalanced Parliament resulting from the 
disproportionality of AV (Reilly, 2002a: 164). The experience of the extremely 
ethnically diverse Papua New Guinea with AV in 1964, 1968 and 1972 is more 
encouraging. AV was successful in motivating candidates to campaign for 
second preferences among rival groups thus greatly moderating ethnic appeals. 
AV also led to pre-election alliances between rival groups, urging voters to cast 
reciprocal preferences (Reilly, 2002a: 165; 2002b: 139). At independence in 
1975, AV was replaced by a first-past-the-post plurality system leading to 
escalating ethnic conflict as elections were reduced to zero-sum contests 
between rival tribal groups. In January 2002, Papua New Guinea’s Parliament 
voted for a return to preferential voting in an attempt to quell ethnic tensions. 
Reilly also notes the success of STV in encouraging parties to moderate their 
positions in order to attract lower-order preferences in Northern Ireland in 1998 
(Reilly, 2002a: 160). 
 
There is therefore some (limited) evidence that preferential voting systems do 
perform according to Horowitz’s theory and dissuade elites from stirring up 
ethnic tensions and instead encourage running moderate campaigns. Of course, 
the electoral system alone cannot ensure the success of democracy and any 
constitutional engineer will readily admit that electoral system design is not a 
panacea. The experience of Fiji illustrated above shows that the type of electoral 
system chosen cannot alone ensure democratic success. 
 
What is clear is that electoral systems do play a role in modifying campaign 
behaviour. Proponents of PR have extolled its virtues largely on the basis of its 
inclusiveness as well as the unconvincing claims that it encourages parties to 
produce ethnically divisive lists and form multi-ethnic coalition governments. 
While the argument that PR will encourage parties to campaign more 
moderately is implicit in their work, little attempt has been made to measure the 
effects of PR on campaign behaviour. Critics of the consociational school have 
been quick to point out that list PR mirrors social cleavages in the legislature, 
with such parties likely to continue to espouse a message that appeals to ‘their’ 
constituents at the exclusion of others (Lardeyret, 1991: 35; Lodge, 1999; Sisk, 
1993: 83; Quade, 1991: 36-7). However, little work has been done to 




Pippa Norris has put forward the case that PR electoral systems encourage 
‘bonding’ parties that campaign in a manner that strengthens their ties with their 
established support base:  
 
'Bonding parties bring together citizens who are homogeneous in 
certain important respects, whether sharing class, faith, or ethnic 
identities, or bound together ideologically by common beliefs about 
capitalism and socialism, environmentalism or nationalism. Bonding 
parties are sticky organisations, promoting the interests of their own 
members, and developing tightly knit social networks and clear one-
of-us boundaries…Bonding parties maintain strong ties with social 
cleavages in the electorate and enduring party loyalties' (Norris, 
2003:.5). 
 
In electoral systems where the electoral threshold is low, she reasons that we can 
expect to see bonding parties since ‘it is often easier to mobilise niche sectors 
with specific social and ideological appeals that are distinctive to each party, 
rather than trying to attract the mass public on consensual issues advocated by 
many parties’ (Ibid.). 
 
Majoritarian electoral systems on the other hand promote ‘bridging’ strategies 
which:  
 
'…involve dissolving traditional boundaries between "us" and 
"them", adopting whatever ideas and policy proposals seem more 
practical and effective regardless of their ideological origins, 
encouraging fuzzy, inclusive and consensual party 
platforms…Bridging strategies trample upon sacerdotal principles 
and traditional one-of-us boundaries' (Norris, 2003: 3). 
 
Majoritarian systems demand bridging strategies since they require higher 
electoral hurdles, as parties need a simple plurality or a majority of votes in each 
district to win. Parties that aim at attracting a narrowly defined sectional interest 
will be unlikely to gain the 50% + 1 votes necessary to secure election. 
 
From the work of Norris, as well as a prima facie observation of South African 
elections, we can hypothesise that parties in South Africa do use racial 
mobilisation as an electoral strategy. The low threshold for representation means 
that parties are not forced to appeal to a wide section of interests to gain 
election, and they can opt for the easier and less risky option of targeting a niche 
sector. Using Norris’s concept of bridging and bonding8, the following analysis 
                                                          
8 Note: This concept has been adapted from the literature on social capital (see Putnam, 
1995). 
 7
ascertains the degree to which parties used racial or ethnic appeals in South 
Africa in their election campaigns in 1994 and 1999.  
 
Before moving to the analysis of the campaigns, it is important to clarify the 
distinction between a racist party and one that engages in an electoral strategy of 
racial mobilisation. A racist party is one that has an ostensibly racist agenda 
founded on the belief that the group they represent has an innate superiority to 
others. Using a strategy that consciously or unconsciously mobilises a group or 
groups on the basis of their race is not necessarily racist in motivation. Parties 
are generally concerned with vote maximisation above all else and will tend to 
adopt measures that they believe will be politically profitable. If success at the 
polls means making appeals to some groups at the expense of others it is likely 
that a party will embark on such a strategy and deal with the consequences of 
such a campaign later.  
 
In South Africa, most parties assert their non-racial credentials. The African 
National Congress (ANC), Democratic Party (DP), National Party (NP), Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) and United Democratic Movement (UDM) all claim to be 
non-racial organisations. In fact, no party in South Africa campaigns on a racist 
platform. It will be shown that racial mobilisation does however remain a key 
electoral strategy for the main parties.  
 
 
2. The Content Analytic Method 
 
All parties are to some degree schizophrenic in their appeals and Norris notes 
that in practice the distinction between bridging and bonding parties involves 
over-simplification and that most parties blend both elements in their campaigns 
(Norris, 2003: 5). The only way to uncover the dominant tendency is to use a 
quantitative assessment of party campaigns. For the purpose of ‘counting’ the 
amount of bridging and bonding themes, a content analysis of the main parties’ 
campaigns in 1994 and 1999 was undertaken. The ANC, DP, NNP, IFP, PAC 
and FF's campaigns were examined since these parties were the main players in 
both the 1994 and 1999 elections, allowing for systematic comparison.  
 
The Cape Argus, Cape Times, Daily Dispatch, Natal Mercury, Diamond Fields 
Advertiser, The Star, Citizen and the Sowetan were searched for reports on party 
meetings in the three months prior to each election.9 This period was chosen to 
                                                          
9 The aim was to use newspapers that are published across South Africa. The Cape Times 
and the Cape Argus are Cape Town based, the Sowetan, the Star and the Citizen are 
published in Gauteng, the Natal Mercury is published in KwaZulu Natal, the Daily Dispatch is 
published in the Eastern Cape and the Diamond Fields Advertiser is based in the Northern 
Cape. The Sowetan has a predominantly black readership and the Citizen has a mainly 
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make absolutely certain that the formal campaign period was analysed in its 
entirety. The use of newspaper reports to uncover the themes touched upon most 
by parties has its advantages and disadvantages. One possible objection is that 
these reports are subject to the selection bias of the reporter covering the event 
as well as other gatekeepers such as sub-editors and news editors. As a 
consequence, not all themes touched on at a meeting are likely to be reported. 
The use of a large and diverse sample of newspapers aims to counter any biases 
in certain newspapers and often the same meeting was covered by a number of 
newspapers. Systemic biases in the media, are harder to identify and therefore 
harder to counter. It must therefore be borne in mind that the sample consists of 
reports on party meetings rather than party meetings per se and must be accepted 
as a limitation of this study. Another possible limitation of the study is the focus 
on party meetings to the exclusion of other campaign media such as posters, 
pamphlets and newspaper advertisements.  
 
There are some advantages to this approach. Newspaper reports provide easy 
access to information and are usually fairly succinct, addressing the key themes. 
This speeds the work of the researcher who avoids getting bogged down in 
reams of party speeches, enabling more meetings to be analysed. This approach 
also provides us with a sample of meetings that were deemed to be important in 
some way. They therefore impacted on a larger audience through being 
published in the newspaper. So, while only 60 people may turn out to see a 
politician in their local town hall, thousands may read a report on the meeting 
the next day.  
 
Approximately 1440 newspapers were searched for reports on party meetings. 
Only reports on party meetings where a member of a political party addressed 
members of the general public were included. Press conferences, speeches to 
parliament and interviews were not included in the sample. The 388 suitable 
meetings found were then summarised in point form. The data was then used to 
generate a coding grid containing the universe of campaign messages. A portion 
of the coding grid is reproduced here: 
 
Table 1: A portion of the coding grid 
 
Code Message 
15 ANC fought for freedom/Liberation struggle an ANC struggle 
16 ANC government inefficient 
17 ANC had a record of human rights abuses/ violent 
18 ANC had brought change 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conservative white readership. The other titles have a more diverse readership and occupy 
the moderate centre politically. 
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This grid was then applied to the point form summary of each meeting. For 
example, Thabo Mbeki telling voters in the Transkei in 1999 that the ANC will 
continue Chris Hani’s struggle was coded as 15 (ANC fought for 
freedom/Liberation struggle an ANC struggle). Once a party’s whole campaign 
had been analysed by assigning codes to the campaign messages, a theme 
breakdown of the party was created. Here is a portion of the ANC's theme 
breakdown in 1994:  
 
Table 2: Example of a theme breakdown 
 
Code Message Frequency 
76 NP a white party/ party of apartheid / Old nats/ racist 37 
198 Right-wing will be dealt with by force 18 
115 Black empowerment  17 
194 Reconciliation/ Racial Unity 17 
 
 
Each message was then categorised according to whether it formed part of a 
bonding, bridging or neutral theme. The concepts of bridging and bonding were 
operationalised according to Table 3 that sets out the rules for classifying the 
campaign messages. The content analysis undertaken here combines a 
qualitative and quantitative approach. Inter-coder reliability is therefore likely to 
be lower than a pure quantitative analysis. However, this approach has been 
necessary given the contextual nature of campaign rhetoric. It is hoped that the 
articulation of hard and fast rules combined with a transparent method will 
enable the reader to see clearly the rationale for the decisions taken.10   
 
                                                          
10 The raw data (i.e.: summary of party meetings), the coding index as well as the theme 
breakdown for each party are available from the Data First Resource Unit at the University of 
Cape Town.  
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Table 3: Typology of bridging and bonding themes 
 




- All in it together 
- Division/separation 
- Us and them 
Reference to 
party or other 
parties 
- We are representative/ 
They are not 
representative like us 
- All parties should 
cooperate for the good of 
all (non-racial 
cooperation) 
- Political tolerance 
- We represent your 
group’s interests/ They 
can’t represent your 
group’s interests as we 
can 
- Let’s join forces to fight 
another party (racial 
alliances) 
- Political intolerance 
Reference to 
policy issue 
- Interest of all 
- Reference to a policy 
issue that is pertinent to a 
group across the racial 
divide 
- Narrow, sectional interest 
- Reference to a policy 
issue that is pertinent only 
to party’s core group. 
 
 
The first type of message is one that refers directly to matters of race. Any 
message referring to the theme of reconciliation or non-racialism was coded as 
bridging, while any message that fostered racial division was coded as bonding. 
Also, a message welcoming groups from across the racial divide was coded as 
bridging, while a message that was explicitly aimed at a party’s traditional 
support base was coded as bonding. Such a categorisation necessitates that we 
label each party according to the race group they principally represent. The 
ANC, PAC and IFP are all considered here as black parties, while the NP, DP 
and FF are classified as white parties according to the following three criteria: 
party history, party leadership and support base. The ANC, PAC and IFP were 
all engaged in extra-parliamentary activity during the apartheid era,11 while the 
NP, DP and FF were all involved in, or have their roots in, apartheid institutions. 
The ANC, PAC and IFP all have black leaders, while whites lead the NP, DP 
and FF. The three black parties all had an overwhelmingly black support base 
going in to both the 1994 and 1999 elections, while the DP and the FF had a 
predominantly white support base. The NP’s support base going in to the 1999 
election was approximately half white, with the other half predominantly 
                                                          
11 The role of the IFP during the apartheid era is ambiguous as although the movement was 
formed with the aim of furthering the interests of Zulus and with the ANC’s blessing, it has 
also been linked to furthering the interests of the apartheid regime (see: Hamilton and Maré, 
1994: 76) 
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coloured, but including some blacks and Indians.12 However, the perception of 
the NP as a ‘white’ party, its association with apartheid and its white leadership 
was enough to classify it a white party for our purposes.  
 
The second type of message is one that refers to a party’s own or another party’s 
character and measures what Horowitz (1985) refers to as racial or ethnic 
outbidding. An attempt by a party to show the electorate that it can represent a 
group’s interests better than another party is an instance of racial outbidding. 
The ANC asserting that the UDM were apartheid collaborators, or the DP 
claiming that the NP was in league with the ANC, are examples of outbidding. 
The aim here was to show voters that the ANC and the DP are more committed 
to their respective constituencies than the UDM and the NP, their respective 
rivals. All instances of ethnic or racial outbidding were coded as bonding since 
the aim is to strengthen the party’s link with a social cleavage. Moderate 
outbidding, on the other hand, is a bridging strategy in which parties attempt to 
show the electorate that they are more inclusive, representative or non-racial 
than another party. One example would be the NNP telling white voters that the 
DP is leading voters into a whites-only cul-de-sac and that white voters should 
join hands with other South Africans by voting NNP. 
 
The third type of campaign message is policy proposals and criticisms of 
existing policies. References to policy can be tricky to code in terms of whether 
they are bridging and bonding, since some policy proposals, while ostensibly 
non-racial, may benefit certain groups at the expense of others. In order to avoid 
the accusation of viewing South African politics though a racial lens, it was 
decided to err on the side of neutrality when coding policy proposals. 
References to economic growth, crime, housing, education, unemployment for 
example, could all be construed as benefiting some races over others. For our 
purposes however, unless proposals in such areas were explicitly aimed at one 
race group over another, they were coded as neutral. Accusations that another 
party was inefficient or corrupt were coded as neutral, as well as references to 
ideological positions such as liberalism and communism. White parties calling 
for the eradication of poverty was coded as bridging since blacks are by far the 
poorest group. White parties calling for merit-based employment policies were 
coded as bonding since the aim is to evoke fears of minority exclusion. Black 
parties calling for the redistribution of land were coded as bonding as such a 
policy has clear distributional consequences determined by race. 
The extract from the ANC's theme breakdown for 1994 illustrated above in 
Table 2 will serve to illustrate how a party's campaign was analysed in terms of 
bridging and bonding. Codes 76, 198 and 115 were all classified as being part of 
a bonding theme. Labelling the NP as the party of apartheid or as a white party 
                                                          
12 For estimates of the racial breakdown of party support in 1994 and 1999 see: Reynolds, 
1994; 1999b 
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(76) clearly aimed to convince blacks that the NP would continue to oppress 
blacks should it come to power. Talk that the ANC would use violence against 
the right wing (198) was also bonding since it aimed to evoke an 'us and them' 
dimension. Promises of black empowerment (115) 'bonded' the ANC to its black 
supporters by pledging redress of disadvantages arising from apartheid. Calls for 
reconciliation and racial unity (194) on the other hand, were clearly part of a 
bridging theme, since the aim was to dissolve racial boundaries entrenched 
during apartheid.  
 
One major difficulty at the outset was deciding how to code appeals made to 
coloured and Indian voters. An ANC politician telling coloured or Indian voters 
that they should not fear the ANC, or that they were welcome in the ANC was 
coded as bridging, since it aimed to convince non-ANC voting coloured and 
Indian voters that they had a home in the ANC. If an ANC politician told 
coloured and Indian voters that they must unite with Africans to fight white 
privilege, it was coded as bonding since the aim was to invoke a racially divisive 
‘oppressor vs. oppressed’ dimension. Similarly, the DP or the NP appealing to 
coloureds and Indians by referring to the exclusion of minorities by the ANC 






Before reporting on the results of the content analysis, it is worth briefly re-
iterating the debate over list PR and campaigning. According to Reynolds, list 
PR encourages parties to publish racially diverse party lists and therefore less 
incentive for parties to engage in racial mobilisation. Also, according to Lijphart 
and Reynolds, the need to form alliances across racial lines in order to govern 
should also dissuade parties from playing the race card. According to the PR 
proponents then, closed list PR should mitigate the incidence of ethnic and racial 
appeals. It is presumed that over the course of a few elections held under closed 
list PR, political actors will refrain more and more from bonding messages as 
they ‘learn’ the incentive structure of the electoral system. 
 
Critics of list PR argue that the system does nothing to prevent parties from 
mobilising voters on the basis of their race. Instead, list PR ‘freezes’ the 
(racialised) party system. Norris adds that the low threshold for election under 
list PR means that parties can afford to be risk averse and target a niche sector, 
instead of attempting to win new support across traditional cleavages. According 
to Horowitz and other critics of closed list PR, we would expect a bonding 
strategy to be dominant under this system, with parties realising the benefits of 
such a strategy after a couple of elections. 
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3.1. Comparison of Both Elections Overall 
 
The results of the content analysis (shown in Table 4 and Figure 1 below) show 
that bonding and bridging messages were, in general, more prevalent in 1994. 
The 1999 campaign was more neutral overall than 1994.  
 
Table 4: Comparison of 1994 and 1999 election overall 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 164 224 
Campaign messages 1091 1451 
Bridging messages 212 178 
Bonding messages 464 548 
Neutral messages 415 725 
 
 



















As an 'Uhuru' or liberation election, it is perhaps unsurprising that politicians, in 
general, were more likely to refer to issues of race in 1994, whether to espouse 
reconciliatory messages or to evoke South Africa's tortured not-too-distant past. 
 
 
3.2 Intra-Party Comparisons 
 
3.2.1 African National Congress 
 
The ANC has a proud history of non-racial struggle against the apartheid 
regime. As the largest party, the ANC spends the most time and energy 
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campaigning and also attracts the most press coverage. Table 5 shows the results 
of the content analysis on the ANC for 1994 and 1999: 
 
Table 5: Content analysis results for the ANC 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 53 91 
Campaign messages 461 574 
Bridging messages 95 69 
Bonding messages 192 271 
Neutral messages 174 234 
 
 
Figure 2 breaks down the proportion of bonding to bridging to neutral themes 
into percentages to see at a glance how the two campaigns were fought: 
 














The results of the content analysis show that the ANC was more prepared to 
evoke black nationalist themes in 1999 than in 1994. This is somewhat 
surprising since ‘Uhuru’ elections are generally held to be contests in which the 
main issue is freedom from colonial repression. The ANC’s intelligence in 1994 
however convinced ANC strategists to refrain from relying too heavily on the 
liberation factor. Surveys and other research conducted by the ANC prior to the 
1994 election showed that voters needed reassurance that the ANC was capable 
of governing and that the National Party had been quite successful in presenting 
itself as a reformed multi-racial party. One of the ANC’s US advisors, Stanley 
Greenberg, thus recommended that it would be more rewarding to reassure 
people about the future than remind them about the past (Lodge, 1994: 29). 
Lodge notes however that ANC speeches in 1994 were less inhibited in 
attacking the National Party than the campaign literature although ANC leaders 
were careful to address white fears (1994: 36-37). This is reflected in the amount 
of bridging messages (approximately one-fifth of the total) counted in the 
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content analysis for 1994. The issue-based nature of the campaign is also 
reflected in the content analysis with neutral messages accounting for nearly 
two-fifths of the total. However, ANC speakers did revert to bonding themes the 
most (42%), especially with accusations that the NP was the party of apartheid, 
that the ANC would deal with the right wing by force, black empowerment in 
the new South Africa and reminding voters that the ANC fought for freedom.  
 
In 1999, the ANC sought to consolidate the large share of the vote it garnered in 
1994 (62%), and perhaps advance in some areas where it had failed to gain a 
plurality in 1994, such as the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (Lodge, 1999: 
70). The campaign again was largely issue-based although, as Lodge notes, 
campaign meetings usually consisted of derisory comments about the opposition 
(1999: 73). Voters were reminded of white parties’ role in apartheid and the 
UDM was denounced often as being made up of apartheid collaborators. ANC 
campaigners often reminded voters that it was the party that fought for freedom 
and that white supremacy was never coming back. Again, the ANC did offer 
some assurances to minorities that it would not change the constitution if it got a 
two-thirds majority and encouraged whites to join hands with the majority. 
Coloureds and Indians were also welcomed into the party, but often the strategy 
of the ANC was to appeal to these groups by asserting that they must unite to 
fight white privilege. 
 
One major problem facing the party was the perception that the ANC had not 
delivered on the election promises made in 1994. There was a danger that the 
rescinding of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the 
slow pace of delivery would signal that the ANC was no longer serious about 
rectifying inequalities inherited from apartheid. In order to counter this 
perception, the ANC promised to speed up change or asserted that the ANC had 
laid the foundation for change, both neutral messages. However, the ANC also 
aimed to convince voters that the legacy of apartheid was preventing the ANC 
from delivering—a bonding message since it implied that it was white privilege, 
rather than the government’s own shortcomings that were responsible for 
delivery failure.  
 
The content analysis shows that the ANC was more prepared to sell itself as the 
party of liberation and black aspiration in 1999 than 1994. Nearly half of its 
messages can be classified as bonding, while only 12% aimed to bridge the 
racial divide through appeals for reconciliation. The most plausible reason for 
this renewed focus on the ANC as liberators was to cover over perceptions that 
the party was failing to deliver on its 1994 promises. A renewed interest in race 
was apparent in the ANC’s discourse from 1998. In May 1998 in a speech to 
open a National Assembly debate on reconciliation and nation building, Mbeki 
said that South Africa was a country divided into two nations:  
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'One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of 
gender or geographic dispersal… the second and larger nation is 
black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural 
areas, the black rural population and the disabled' (Mbeki, 1998a: 71-
72). 
 
This tendency of the post-Mandela ANC government to rely on race is noted by 
Marks Chabedi who argues that the ANC continues to see itself as the 
‘mouthpiece of an "oppressed nation”’, leading it to downplay intra-black 
inequalities and to emphasise the relative wealth of whites' (Chabedi, 2001: 2).  
 
 
3.2.2 Democratic Party 
 
The DP was born out of the liberal tradition in South African politics, formed in 
1989 as an amalgam of white parliamentary opposition to the left of the ruling 
National Party. 
 
The DP’s 1999 campaign was more vigorous than in 1994 and the increase in 
meetings covered by the press in 1999 shows that either the DP had more 
meetings or that they simply attracted more media attention. Table 6 shows the 
increase in reported DP activity in 1999: 
 
Table 6: Content analysis results for the DP 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 16 43 
Campaign messages 135 337 
Bridging messages 24 22 
Bonding messages 40 137 
Neutral messages 71 178 
 
It is particularly noteworthy that the amount of bridging messages declined by 2 
for the 1999 election, although messages recorded overall increased by 202. 
Figure 3 illustrates the increase in proportion of bonding to bridging themes by 
the 1999 election: 
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The amount of neutral messages in both campaigns remained virtually constant, 
allowing us to clearly see the increase of bonding messages and decline of 
bridging messages in 1999. In 1994, bridging messages accounted for under 
18% of the parties overall message and was reduced to a mere 6.5% in 1999. By 
contrast, the amount of bonding messages increased from 30% in 1994 to 40% 
in 1999 and bonding themes approached neutral messages as the favoured theme 
of the DP’s campaign. 
 
In 1994, the DP had found itself in a precarious position. The new inclusive 
dispensation had little need for a party to defend the interests of blacks, as Helen 
Suzman had done as an MP for the Progressive Federal Party (forerunner of the 
DP) during apartheid. Also, the reforms initiated by de Klerk, effectively stole 
the DP’s thunder. As both the ANC and the NP moved closer to a liberal 
democratic way of thinking, the DP was in danger of being squeezed out. Welsh 
notes that the DP opted to attack both the NP and the ANC on their records, 
principally in respect of human rights and of economic management (Welsh, 
1994: 110). This is reflected in the results of the content analysis, with the main 
bridging theme for the DP in 1994 being attacks on the NP for being a white 
party and the party of apartheid. The most predominant bonding theme was 
references to the ANC as a dangerous party. 
 
On the whole, the DP’s campaign in 1994 was mainly neutral, with the DP 
touting itself as a strong opposition, based on its track record of opposing the 
National Party. Other popular themes included championing free enterprise over 
communism and state intervention as well as calls for federalism. 
 
The DP’s dismal result in the 1994 election (1.7% of the vote) was attributed to 
the party’s failure to break out of its white suburban and predominantly English-
speaking support base. Welsh blamed the result on the party’s ‘cerebral 
approach’ to politics where ‘carefully worked out, rational policies, lack mass 
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appeal in a political system where calls to racial and ethnic “blood” are the 
stock-in-trade of politicians on the stump’ (Welsh, 1994: 115).   
After the 1994 election new party leader Tony Leon announced that the DP 
could not afford to be too ‘fastidious, precious or prissy’ if it wanted to ‘attract 
the numbers (we) need to make a difference’ (Leon, 1998). The 1999 fight back 
campaign that evolved from these sentiments was an adversarial one justified as 
necessary to keep an increasingly powerful government in check. It also quickly 
became evident that the DP was not concerned how their support was increased, 
even if vote maximisation meant a strategy that was widely interpreted as 
reactionary and conservative, if not racist, in tone. 
 
The most prevalent message at party meetings in 1999 was that the ANC sought 
a two-thirds majority to change the Constitution. The ruling party was accused 
of growing authoritarianism and re-racialising society. Affirmative action was 
also a favourite message and DP campaigners proposed the scrapping of racial 
quotas and the re-introduction of merit as the sole criteria for employment. The 
mantra that minorities were being excluded under an ANC government was 
clearly designed to extend the DP’s support to conservative whites, as well as 
coloureds and Indians who felt threatened under a black government. This 
extension of support however must not be seen as a bridging strategy. A 
bridging strategy is a catch-all strategy where a party appeals to all groups on 
the basis of racially neutral appeals. The 1999 fight back campaign however, 
represented an attempt by the DP to bond whites, coloureds and Indians into a 
fearful minority bloc.  
 
 
3.2.3 The National Party 
 
The National Party entered the 1994 election as the hitherto dominant force in 
South African politics and the party responsible for apartheid. As Table 7 shows, 
there was less reported NP activity in 1999 than in 1994.  
 
Table 7: Content analysis results for the NP 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 48 33 
Campaign messages 267 201 
Bridging messages 78 59 
Bonding messages 86 25 




The comparison of party strategy in Figure 4 shows that the NP (renamed the 
New National Party or NNP) re-oriented its strategy for the 1999 election. In 
1994, the NP had campaigned with a nearly equal proportion of bonding to 
bridging themes. In 1999, the amount of messages that played on minority fears 
decreased markedly. 
 
















Research carried out by the NP in 1993 showed that 60% of black respondents 
had ‘no negative feelings’ towards the NP and 28% ‘felt good’ about the NP, 
while only 24% realised that the NP had changed over the past five years 
(Giliomee, 1994: 55). Accordingly, the NP spent a great deal of electioneering 
in 1994 attempting to convince voters that it was responsible for the sweeping 
changes that made the election possible (Meredith, 1994: 153). The claim that 
the NP ended apartheid—often accompanied by an apology for apartheid—was 
accompanied with a message that depicted the ANC as a ‘dangerous party’ 
(Giliomee, 1994: 56). The twin strategy of demonising the ANC and distancing 
itself from apartheid was confirmed in our content analysis. The top three 
‘bonding’ themes in 1994 were that the ANC was violent, that it was 
authoritarian and that the ANC was not politically tolerant. The top three 
bridging themes in 1994 were that the NP ended apartheid and/or apologised for 
apartheid, the NP welcomed blacks and that the NP welcomed all race groups.  
 
In 1999, the NNP actively sought to attract black, coloured and Indian voters by 
preaching racially inclusive and cooperative politics. As Willie Breytenbach 
notes: ‘The NNP’s repositioning under van Schalkwyk was indeed an attempt to 
make it more inclusive, as the election of David Malatsi as deputy leader, 
testified.’ (Breytenbach, 1999: 123) The new image of the NNP was apparent in 
van Schalkwyk’s speech to the National Assembly debate on the final report of 
the TRC:  
 
'The pain and suffering, the injustice of the apartheid era, we must 
never allow to happen again. Therefore it calls for a pact between the 
responsible leaders of today, to close the book on past conflict and 
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despair and to open a new book for future hope' (Financial Mail, 
March 5, 1999). 
 
The desire to be seen as the most representative party is apparent from the 
NNP’s 1999 Manifesto. In it, the NNP professes to be the ‘most multi-racial 
party in South Africa’. They state that the NNP’s membership is the most multi-
racial (‘to the embarrassment of the ANC and other fringe parties’), that the 
NNP stands for ‘genuine tolerance and respect for diversity’, ‘represent a broad 
and inclusive South African patriotism that transcends race, language and 
religion’, ‘make co-operation between communities work’ and internally ‘reflect 
unity and our nation’s cultural diversity’ (New National Party, 1999: 213). 
 
On the campaign trail, the NNP did alert voters to what it saw as the 
authoritarian tendencies of the ANC—the most common ‘bonding’ message 
apparent in reports of NNP meetings. The most favoured ‘bridging’ themes 
were that the NNP represented all race groups, that the NNP believed in 
inclusive and cooperative government, that the DP was a white party, the 
importance of racial unity and that other white parties wanted to separate whites. 
The overall decrease in the proportion of bonding messages in 1999 confirms 
that the NNP’s rhetoric had become more inclusive since the 1994 campaign, 
which was itself far less exclusive than commonly thought.   
 
 
3.2.4 The Freedom Front 
 
As could be expected from a party that takes its raison d'être to be the 
establishment of an Afrikaner homeland or volkstaat, the FF did not 
communicate many bridging themes and focused mainly on bonding in 1994 
and 1999. 
 
Table 8: Content analysis of the FF 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 12 18 
Campaign messages 56 90 
Bridging messages 2 5 
Bonding messages 34 55 
Neutral messages 20 30 
 
 
Figure 5 clearly shows how little the strategy of the party changed over both 
elections: 
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In 1994, Constand Viljoen registered the FF for the election twenty minutes 
before the deadline. This move was deeply unpopular among many of his 
erstwhile colleagues in the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), who had staunchly 
refused to participate in the election (Van Rooyen, 1994: 95). The 
participation of a conservative, Afrikaner nationalist party in the election was 
more down to Viljoen’s pragmatism than acceptance of the new 
dispensation. As Van Rooyen noted: 
 
'Throughout the FF’s election campaign, the party emphasised that 
although it had (reluctantly) agreed to participate within the system, it 
still regarded the constitution as fatally flawed, and was only 
participating to prove support for a volkstaat' (Van Rooyen, 1994: 
100). 
 
Our content analysis showed that the FF’s dominant bonding message in the 
1994 election was indeed calls for a volkstaat, followed by claims that the ANC 
was authoritarian. The only messages that could be classified as bridging were 
expressions of solidarity with the plight of Zulus that also wanted some 
territorial autonomy.  
 
The FF’s campaign in 1999 was strikingly similar to 1994 and the party 
continued to target Afrikaners with calls for a volkstaat—again by far the most 
discernible theme from reports on party meetings. Viljoen blamed this on the 
poor showing of the party in 1999:  
 
'Afrikaners must have got the impression that we as a party are only 
concerned about self-determination and nothing else. We have only 





3.2.5 Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 
 
The PAC was founded in 1959 by a group of ‘Africanists’ in the ANC who had 
become disgruntled with the alliance with other political groups, particularly the 
white Congress of Democrats. Shortly after its formation, the PAC, under the 
leadership of Robert Sobukwe, initiated the pass law campaign that led to the 
Sharpeville massacre. The PAC was banned along with the ANC in 1960.  
 
A glance at the message breakdown in Table 9 and Figure 6 shows that bridging 
messages were rare in 1994 and 1999: 
 
Table 9: Content analysis of PAC meetings 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 21 17 
Campaign messages 114 98 
Bridging messages 8 5 
Bonding messages 82 36 
Neutral messages 24 57 
 
 

















There is however a discernible shift away from bonding messages and towards 
more racially neutral rhetoric in 1999. In 1994, under the leadership of Clarence 
Makwetu, the PAC had attempted to cast itself as the party of militant black 
nationalism that could achieve black liberation where the ANC had failed. The 
power-sharing agreement of the Interim Constitution was seen as a sell out by 
the ANC and the PAC argued that the final liberation of blacks could only come 
about when majority rule had been achieved. The militancy of the PAC was also 
expressed in its derogatory references to whites and ‘white’ parties. As one 
analyst wrote: ‘(The PAC’s) lapse into rhetoric, more often wild and of the “one 
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bullet”13 and “whites must leave” variety, and historically based claims of 
legitimacy, were the most common features of its campaigning in the run-up to 
the election’ (Cooper, 1994: 117). The content analysis showed that the most 
common bonding message was the call for the redistribution of land, followed 
by claims that the PAC was the only true Africanist party, the rejection of a 
volkstaat and an end to white domination. Bridging themes were far less 
frequent and included messages that claimed the PAC to be representative of all 
race groups, calls for peace and that whites can also be African if they pledge 
their allegiance to Africa. This last message was however a weak attempt to 
play down the party’s ‘Africanism’ in certain circles. Cooper noted that ‘despite 
carefully intellectualised arguments about the definition of an African as a 
person owing allegiance to the soil rather than skin colour, nearly all whites fear 
the PAC’ (1994: 118).  
 
Under the leadership of Rev. Stanley Mogoba in 1999, the PAC aimed to 
reverse its public image as an organisation bent on avenging the suffering of 
black people (Maseko, 1999: 126). Evidence from the content analysis confirms 
that the PAC did wage a more neutrally oriented campaign in 1999. The most 
common messages on the campaign trail in 1999 were references to crime. 
Other popular neutral messages included references to education, corruption and 
unemployment. In 1999, the most common bonding themes were land 
redistribution, uplifting the poor, that the ANC did not care about ‘ordinary’ 
people, the PAC was a black party and that the majority continues to lose out to 
the minority. Such bonding messages were however far less prevalent in 1999 
than they had been in 1994. Bridging messages were again rather muted and 
consisted of appeals for racial unity and that Africanness was based on a sense 
of belonging rather than skin colour.  
 
 
3.2.6 Inkatha Freedom Party  
 
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi formed Inkatha in 1975 as a 'cultural liberation 
movement' in the homeland of KwaZulu with the aim to politicise and unify 
Zulu ethnicity (Hamilton and Maré, 1994: 77). Angered at the perceived 
bilateralism between the Nationalist government and the ANC at Codesa14, 
Buthelezi only agreed to participate in the 1994 election a week before it took 
place. This was only once he had secured certain concessions including a 
kingdom for the Zulu monarch. 
 
As Table 10 shows, campaign activity was low in 1994, a result of the IFP’s 
reluctance to take part.  
                                                          
13 i.e.: 'One settler, one bullet'.  
14 Convention for a Democratic South Africa. 
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Table 10: Content analysis of IFP meetings 
 
 1994 1999 
Party meetings 14 22 
Campaign messages 58 151 
Bridging messages 5 18 
Bonding messages 36 24 
Neutral messages 57 109 
 
 
While campaign activity increased dramatically in 1999, the number of bonding 
messages actually decreased. The swing from a bonding campaign in 1994 to a 
mainly neutral one in 1999 is shown in Figure 7 below. 
 
















In 1994, the most common bonding messages were calls for provincial 
autonomy (effectively a Zulu province), that the ANC and the NNP were 
partners, that the ANC was a violent party, that the IFP had fought in the 
struggle and that the IFP was prepared to use violence to achieve its ends. These 
results are not surprising in light of the flare-up in ANC-IFP violence that had 
occurred during the transition and IFP threats that it would not participate in the 
election. Few bridging messages were found for the 1994 campaign and the 
most common neutral messages were statements that affirmed the IFP’s 
commitment to a free market economy.  
 
By 1999, relations between the ANC and the IFP had improved dramatically as 
a result of alliances formed at national and provincial level. The IFP’s Lionel 
Mtshali addressed the ANC conference in December 1998. Thabo Mbeki made a 
speech to the IFP’s Annual General Conference in July of that year where he 
stressed the importance of African solidarity due to the shared experience of 
oppression at the hands of the apartheid regime (Mbeki, 1998b: 3). Mbeki and 
Buthelezi signed a peace pact in Durban in May, while supporters of both parties 
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chanted: 'Woza Woza ANC! Woza Woza IFP!' (Come on ANC! Come on IFP!). 
Lionel Mtshali said: 'It is a day of reconciliation. It is hopefully a day marking 
the start of a process that in time will play itself out in the complete 
normalisation of relations between us' (Daily Dispatch, May 15 1999). 
 
The conciliatory stance of the IFP to the ANC—what Schrire has termed 
‘cooptive opposition’ (2001: 31)—hindered the IFP in campaigning on a blatant 
Zulu nationalist ticket. Stirring up old tensions would have compromised the 
power-sharing agreement between the two parties. Evidence from the content 
analysis indicates that the IFP did largely refrain from attacking the ANC and 
mobilising Zulu identity in 1999. Campaigning under the election slogan, ‘a 
revolution of goodwill’, Buthelezi typically rattled off a ‘wish list’ of ethnically-
neutral policy issues such as crime, unemployment, corruption, education and 
service delivery. Bonding messages decreased dramatically, although some 
references to provincial autonomy were still in evidence. The proportion of 
bridging messages increased marginally as the IFP sought to convince voters 
that the IFP was most effective as a partner of the ANC.  
 
A journalist noting the shift in IFP campaign rhetoric made the following 
observation: 
 
'This is a different Buthelezi. A far cry from the tense, belligerent 
man who refused to take part in the 1994 elections and took 
KwaZulu-Natal to the brink of a civil war before finally joining the 
race with only seven days to the April 27 polls' (The Star, May 27 
1999). 
 
In 1999 the IFP eschewed stoking up Zulu nationalist sentiment in favour of 
continuing to play a role in national politics through its agreement with the 
ANC. The benefits of maintaining a national profile, through ‘cooption’, could 
however bear heavily on the very survival of the party, a point made by Gerhard 
Maré:  
 
'The IFP is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand its strongest card 
has always been the combination of speaking for ‘all Zulu’ and 
controlling the traditional leaders of the Zulu nation, the amakhosi, 
and on the other hand it is being absorbed into the ANC as the 






3.3 Inter-Party Comparisons 
 
Having discussed the evolution of each party’s electoral strategy, we are in a 
position to demonstrate how each party compared with its main rivals in each 
election. We shall start by comparing those with a predominantly black support 
base. Figure 8 shows how the ANC, PAC and IFP campaigned in 1994: 
 

















In 1994, all of the three main black parties espoused mainly bonding themes, 
especially the PAC. The ANC used the least amount of bonding themes and the 
most bridging themes. As the premier liberation movement, the ANC won the 
election overwhelmingly with 62.65% of the vote, while the IFP gained a 
respectable 10.54%. The PAC only managed 1.25%. 
 

















In 1999, only one black party, the ANC, embarked on a campaign that was 
mainly bonding in orientation. The PAC and IFP largely dispensed with their 
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militant rhetoric and focused instead on neutral policy issues. The ANC’s 
strategy allowed it to increase its vote share from 62.65% to 66.35%. The PAC’s 
support dropped from 1.25% to 0.71% and the IFP’s from 10.54% to 8.58%. 
Despite a growing perception that the ANC had not delivered, the party was still 
able to consolidate its nation-wide support by continuing to posit itself as the 
true liberator of black Africans. The ANC’s bonding strategy was useful in 
convincing voters to turn out and vote, especially when coupled with the 
assertion that an ANC two-thirds majority would enable the party to speed up 
change and reverse the legacy of apartheid quicker.  
 
Winning the election in the Western Cape also increased the ANC’s overall vote 
share. The unwillingness of the ANC to convince coloureds that they had a place 
in an ‘African’ party and the NP’s willingness to wage a swart gevaar campaign 
in 1994 is cited as a key reason for the success of the NP in the Western Cape in 
that election (Eldridge, 1997: 139-140). In 1999, the ANC was more prepare to 
play the race card in the Western Cape by stressing the importance of African-
coloured solidarity to fight white privilege. The NNP on the other hand, was 
more reluctant in 1999 to use the racially divisive tactics it had used profitably 
in 1994. 
 
A comparison of the strategies of the main ‘white’ parties in 1994, reveals that 
the party that espoused the most bonding themes was the right-wing Freedom 
Front. The DP and the NP had similar strategies, although the NP was more 
concerned with demonstrating solidarity with black South Africans and 
apologising for apartheid.  
 
















Figure 11 shows that in 1999, the DP positioned itself to play on the fears of 
minorities who felt excluded under a black government, using a considerably 
greater proportion of bonding to bridging themes than it had in 1994. In contrast, 
the NNP adopted an overt catch-all strategy in 1999. The FF’s strategy remained 
the same as it had done in 1994. 
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The contrast between the DP and the NNP’s campaign in 1999 is striking. As 
the DP sought to position itself as the protector of minority interests, the NNP 
sought to bridge the racial divide. The NNP asserted that whites should join 
hands with their black compatriots and should not be misled by the exclusive 
campaigning of the DP. In 1999 the DP’s national support base grew from 
1.73% to 9.56%, while the NNP’s declined from 20.39% to 6.87%. The FF’s 
vote share declined from 2.17% to 0.8%, although their strategy remained 
essentially the same. It is likely that the DP was responsible for poaching some 
FF voters and some FF politicians had defected to the party early in the 
campaign (The Star, February 15 1999). FF leader Constand Viljoen conceded 
that the DP had been successful in picking up some conservative Afrikaner 
votes, attributing this to their 'white style of politics' and claiming that the 
Freedom Front was 'more African-like' (Cape Argus, March 12 1999).  
 
The failure of the FF to garner a substantial amount of votes illustrates the 
limitations of bonding strategies. In order to be successful, a party must bond a 
constituency that has common ground and can become a force in politics. The 
DP’s bonding of Indians, coloureds and white English and Afrikaans-speakers 
as the ‘excluded minority’ was a masterstroke, since it maximised vote share 
without the need to dilute its stance by adopting a true catch-all strategy. The FF 
on the other hand is limited by its concentration on the conservative Afrikaner 
vote. 
 
Evidence indicates that most of the DP’s support in 1999 came from disaffected 
NNP voters. The NNP lost to the DP at every voting station in its former 
stronghold of Centurion. This pattern was repeated in Vereeniging, Heidelberg, 
Randburg and Potchefstroom. The DP emerged triumphant in strongly 
Afrikaans-speaking neighbourhoods, with majorities in such traditional NNP 
terrain as Krugersdorp North, Johannesburg’s Mondeor, Vereeniging’s Drie 
Riviere and Pretoria’s Lynwood Ridge (EISA, 1999: 342). In the traditionally 
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conservative areas of Ventersdorp and Potchefstroom, the DP emerged second 
to the ANC, suggesting that it beat the NNP in gaining the ‘white’ vote here 
(EISA, 1999: 358). The DP emerged as the main contender to the ANC in 
coloured and Indian areas, with a 25% share of the vote in such communities. 
Gains in these areas had not been at the expense of the ANC, but from 
conservative coloureds who had voted NNP in 1994 (EISA, 1999: 341). The DP 
also did well in urban coloured areas around Port Elizabeth and achieved some 
of its highest levels of support in rural coloured areas in the far western districts. 
of the Eastern Cape (EISA, 1999: 328). 
 
A comparison of the racial breakdown of support for the NNP and the DP in 
1999 shows the emerging popularity of the DP among white voters: 
 
Table 11: Racial breakdown of NNP and DP support in 1999 
 
 DP vote 
share 




% of NNP 
support 
Black 180 000 12% 200 000 18% 
White 1 200 000 77% 340 000 31% 
Coloured 75 000 5% 480 000 44% 
Indian 90 000 6% 80 000 7% 
Total 1 545 000 100% 1 100 000 100% 
   Source: Adapted from Reynolds, 1999: 183-185 
 
 
The DP managed to attract over three and a half times more white votes than the 
NNP with white voters accounting for over three quarters of the DP’s 1999 
support base. White voters made up less than a third of the NNP’s support base 
in the 1999 election. Despite attaining 445 000 less votes in total, the NNP still 
managed to gain 20 000 more black voters than the DP and 405 000 more 
coloured voters, who now accounted for the greatest share of the NNP’s support 
base. These figures contrast greatly with results of the 1994 election where the 
NP received nearly two million white votes and the DP only 280 000 (Reynolds, 
1994: 194, 196). 
 
The inter-party comparisons suggest that in 1999 the ANC and the DP were able 
to position themselves as the true parties of black aspiration and protector of 
minority interests respectively. Between them, they account for just over three-
quarters of the national vote. The unwillingness of other black parties to adopt a 
bonding strategy in 1999 explains how the ANC was able to consolidate its 
electoral superiority. The DP was able to emerge as the official opposition, 
outbidding the NNP for the votes of disaffected minorities. It is an unfortunate 
reality that in South Africa, voters imbued with the historical experience of 
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apartheid, react more favourably to parties that are the most convincing as the 
protector of their group’s interests.  
 
 
3.4 Analysis and Implications 
 
The results of the content analysis show our original hypothesis to be only 
partially correct as the role of list PR is apparently not as mechanical as 
originally thought. Not all parties in South Africa rely on racial mobilisation as 
their principal campaign strategies. With a closed list PR electoral system in 
operation in 1994 and 1999, many parties attempted to wage largely neutral 
campaigns (the DP and NNP in 1994, and the PAC and IFP in 1999) and the 
NNP waged a predominantly bridging campaign in 1999. Bonding was the 
dominant strategy in only half of the campaigns under examination. What does 
emerge from the content analysis however, is that parties that attempt a ‘catch-
all’ strategy are punished at the polls, while those that use racially divisive 
tactics profit.  
 
 
3.4.1 The Correlation of Bonding Strategies and Electoral 
Success 
 
The correlation of an increase in bonding messages and increase in vote share 
can be most clearly seen if we construct a bonding index for each party. The 
bonding index is the increase (or decrease) in bonding to bridging themes in 
each election. Table 12 shows each parties’ bonding index in percentages, 
holding neutral themes constant: 
 
Table 12: Bonding Index of each party in 1994 and 1999 
 
 1994 1999 Bonding 
 increase/decrease
ANC +20 +35.2 +15.2 
DP +11.8 +34.2 +22.4 
NNP +3 -17 -20 
IFP +43.1 +4 -39.1 
PAC +64.9 +31.6 -33.3 
FF +57.1 +55.5 -1.6 
 
 
Table 13 shows the net increase or decrease in vote share over the two elections 
and the correlation with bridging and bonding. 
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Table 13: Correlation of bonding and electoral success 
 




ANC 62.65% 66.35% +3.7% +15.2 
DP 1,73% 9.56% +7.83% +22.4 
NNP 20.39% 6.87% -13.52% -20 
IFP 10.54% 8.58% -1.96% -39.1 
PAC 1.25% 0.71% -0.54% -33.3 
FF 2.17% 0.80% -1.37% -1.6 
 
 
Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate the correlation of an increase in voter support and 
an increase in the proportion of bonding to bridging messages. The ANC and the 
DP both managed to increase their vote share through appealing to a segment 
defined in racial terms. For the DP this meant a message that promised 
protection of minorities (whites, Indians and coloureds) against the majority. 
The ANC cast itself as the party of the previously oppressed majority (blacks, 
coloureds and Indians) who continue to lose out due to the legacy of apartheid. 
The other four parties all decreased their bonding messages in 1999 and all saw 
a decrease in their vote share.  
 
Having established a correlation of racially exclusive (bonding) campaigning 
and electoral success, two tasks remain. The first is to explain the role of the 
electoral system in encouraging parties to campaign exclusively. The second is 
to consider, and rule out, other variables that may explain the success of the 
ANC and the DP in 1999. 
 
 
3.4.2 The Role of List PR in Encouraging Bonding  
Strategies 
 
List PR creates a political system in which societal and ethnic cleavages are 
mirrored in the legislature. Parties based on ethnic and racial fault lines are 
likely to continue to espouse a message that appeals to ‘their’ constituents at the 
exclusion of others. In a divided society where ascriptive cleavages remain 
deeply embedded, it is tempting for parties to mobilise groups along these 
divisions. An electoral system in such a society should therefore encourage 
parties to campaign moderately or even to seek support across historical 
divisions. List PR in South Africa does nothing to encourage parties to refrain 
from mobilising racial cleavages.  
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In addition, through fragmenting the party system, list PR has a centrifugal 
effect on the party system as more extremist parties, such as the FF and the PAC 
are able to gain entry into parliament. In order to consolidate existing support, 
‘moderate’ parties such, as the ANC and the DP, must convince their supporters 
that they can best represent their interests by using bonding strategies that 
involve racial mobilisation. Parties that are able to racially outbid their rivals 
will therefore be the most successful in the election. Parties that attempt to 
campaign by casting their net more widely tend to lose out in the bidding war, as 
their strategy is likely to be viewed as a weakness by voters whose race 
consciousness has been heightened by the divisive campaigning of other parties.  
 
In sum, list PR does nothing to curb the inherent tendencies of parties in a 
divided society to mobilise along ascriptive lines. Furthermore, through 
allowing for more extremist parties to enter into the legislature, list PR may 
actually create a party system where exclusive parties are rewarded and 
inclusive parties punished.   
 
Of course, not all voters are mobilised by racial concerns. Some DP voters no 
doubt still see the party as their liberal home and many ANC voters are still 
attracted to the party because of its tradition of non-racial struggle. However, to 
borrow the words of Kinder and Sanders, 'voters are to some degree captives of 
the choices and the campaigns they are presented' (1996: 196). Even voters who 
are not mobilised according to racial considerations may still find themselves 
voting for a party that uses racially divisive themes in its campaigning. In this 
way, old anti-apartheid liberals who continue to vote for the DP find themselves 
supporting a party that uses a strategy comparable to the swart gevaar 
campaigning of the old National Party.15  
 
 
3.4.3 Bonding as an Explanatory Factor for Electoral 
Success 
 
That not all voters are mobilised according to racial concerns serves to highlight 
a potential criticism of the argument put forward. It is possible that the 
correlation of bonding strategies and electoral success is fortuitous and that 
other factors can account for the increase in the ANC and the DP’s support. It 
may be argued for instance that the deepening of ANC patronage networks may 
have allowed the party to do even better in 1999 and that perhaps the ANC’s 
dominance may have tempted voters in 1999 to ‘support the winning team’. 
While such speculations may be valid and could marginally weaken the 
                                                          
15 This is captured well by a report on a DP meeting where a long-standing supporter 
complained that the DP had the guts to fight back, but did not seem to have the guts to put 
up Xhosa posters (Addis, 1999).  
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argument put forward here, evidence does suggest that the ANC’s campaign in 
1999 was responsible for convincing its supporters to turn out and once again 
vote for the party of black liberation. Figure 12 demonstrates how voting 
intention for the ANC had waned dramatically by the end of 1998: 
 
Figure 12: Voting intention for the ANC 1994-1999  
 












































































































Source: Taylor, Mattes and Africa, 1999 
 
Only 51% of all voters in September 1998 said that they would vote for the 
ANC 'if there was an election tomorrow' (Taylor, Mattes & Africa, 1999). While 
67% of black voters in September 1998 said that they would vote for the ANC, 
only 46% of black voters surveyed said they identified with the ANC—down 
from 75% in September 1994 (ibid., 1999). This suggests that black voters at 
this point did not feel especially close to the ANC, but would vote for them for 
the lack of a credible alternative. It therefore became crucial for the ANC to 
prevent any other party emerging as credible in the eyes of black voters. It is 
also quite possible that the timing of Mbeki’s ‘two nations’ speech was designed 
to buoy up support for the ANC among black voters at this juncture. 
 
In January 1999, the ANC released a document urging people to vote for the 
ANC for it to continue its emancipatory project (ANC, 1999). Opposition parties 
are described as counter-revolutionaries, with the sole aim of defeating the 
democratic movement as a whole, and the ANC in particular. These parties are 
derided for being opponents of 'the fundamental transformation of our country 
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into a non-racial and non-sexist democracy' (ibid., 1999). In contrast, the ANC 
is posited as the liberator of the oppressed (black) masses, requiring the renewed 
mandate of its people to continue with transformation. This strategy is 
straightforward: encourage black voters to turn out and vote by stressing racial 
solidarity in the face of opponents bent on reversing the gains made by the ANC 
since 1994.  
 
Support for the DP (mainly among whites) had increased steadily since 1994, 
although only 1% of black voters surveyed in April 1999 said that they would 
vote for the party. Figure 13 shows the steady increase in voting intention for the 
DP: 
 
Figure 13: Voting intention for the DP 1994-1999  
 











































































































Source: Taylor, Mattes and Africa, 1999 
 
Plausible arguments could be made that the DP was able to usurp the NNP for 
the white vote because of what Schrire has termed 'robust opposition', an 
adversarial Westminster-style politics cultivated by the DP. As he writes:  
 
'Certainly the dramatic growth in the DP’s support since 1994 must 
be directly attributed to what it characterised during the 1999 
election as its "fight back" campaign and a public perception that the 
party is a tough and fearless critic of the ANC' (Schrire, 2001: 31). 
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The NNP, in contrast, began to be seen as a weak opposition to the ANC and it 
was reported in Finance Week that the DP, with its seven MPs, had asked 
almost as many questions as the NNP (with its 82 MPs) during question time in 
the National Assembly between 1994 and 1998 (Camay and Gordon, 1999: 
170). The replacing of popular NP leader FW de Klerk with the relatively 
inexperienced Marthinus van Schalkwyk also probably had a bearing on public 
perceptions of the party. The poor performance of the NP in the Government of 
National Unity and subsequent resignation from the power-sharing cabinet 
could also have alienated voters.  
 
To view the DP’s rise and NNP’s concomitant fall as purely down to party 
performance however, is to ignore the racial dynamics of a divided society like 
South Africa. A ‘weak’ opposition in a segmented party system could only be 
perceived as one that does not have the ability to adequately protect its (racially 
defined) constituents’ interests. Furthermore, the argument that the DP’s 
adversarial style alone was responsible for their surge of support relies on the 
dubious assertion that in general, whites are more receptive to this style of 
politics than blacks.  
 
There can be no doubt that the DP’s campaigning in 1999 sent out the message 
to all voters that a vote for the DP was a vote for the protection of minorities 
who were being excluded under a black government. This is why conservative 
NP voters and even right-wingers switched allegiance to the DP. It is also why 
the party was unable to extend its support to black voters. As Mattes wrote after 
the election:  
 
'… the DP must have guessed how this message would be seen in the 
black community… they must have foreseen that it would be 
perceived as a fundamental attack on the competence and integrity of 
the black government as well as on keys to black advancement such 
as affirmative action and government intervention in the workplace' 
(Mail & Guardian, May 21-27 1999). 
 
 If the DP’s campaigning and rhetoric was racially neutral, we should surely 
expect their support among black South Africans to be higher. However, a party 
that largely ignores black townships on the campaign trail, has an 
overwhelmingly white leadership and takes minority exclusion as the key theme 
of its campaign, alienated the vast majority of black voters.  
 
In contrast, the NNP sent out the message to the electorate that it was the party 
for all. The inclusiveness of the party was confirmed by the overt catch-all 
strategy that the NNP adopted for the 1999 election. Unfortunately for the NNP, 
the party failed to hold on to its white support base that had become estranged 
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from a party that failed to protect its interests. The strategy was also hardly 
convincing to most black voters who no doubt saw the NNP’s new inclusiveness 
as a cheap election ploy from the party responsible for apartheid. 
Over time, parties will realise that, under list PR, they are able to maximise 
support through resorting to a bonding strategy, as the ANC and the DP did in 
1999. It is for this reason that consideration should be given to devising an 
electoral system that encourages parties to adopt bridging strategies in order to 
break down the segmental nature of South African politics. The plurality 
systems used in most commonwealth countries could possibly encourage 
smaller parties to broaden their appeal, since the threshold for election is much 
higher. However, the exaggeration of majorities due to vote wastage, in such 
systems (Rae, 1967) would exclude many parties from participation and could 
lead to discontent among minority groups. The preferential system proposed by 
Horowitz, as well as the Single Transferable Vote system used in Ireland and 
Australia are more likely to succeed in encouraging the growth of catch-all 
parties. These systems could possibly counter the divisive nature of list PR, but 
without excluding groups from political participation. In light of the 
consequences of list PR demonstrated here, it is important that further research 
is conducted into the viability of adopting such systems in South Africa. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis of party campaigning has shown that the ANC and the DP (now 
Democratic Alliance) have emerged as the dominant party and official 
opposition through their willingness to sound racially divisive themes in their 
appeals to voters. To promote democratic stability in South Africa, parties must 
break out of their narrow, racial support bases. In order to do this, parties must 
be encouraged to campaign by appealing to all voters. One way of encouraging 
more inclusive campaigning is to adopt an electoral system that provides 
incentives for parties to attract votes across the racial divide.  
 
Unfortunately, the current closed list PR system in South Africa does not offer 
any incentives for parties to campaign inclusively. List PR encourages parties to 
play the race card as the fragmentation of the party system allows for the 
ascendance of ethnic or racial outbidders. This puts pressure on ‘moderate’ 
parties to mobilise voters along racial lines in order to keep their support base 
intact. The success of parties that concentrate on making narrow, sectional 
appeals indicates why parties in the future may be inclined to campaign by using 
a bonding strategy. 
 
Diminishing the salience of race as a category of political mobilisation is 
unlikely to occur through changing the electoral system alone. It is also 
 37
dependent on the will of politicians to refrain from adopting racially exclusive 
and inflammatory tactics. This political will is most likely to come about 
however, when politicians are rewarded at the polls for inclusive campaigning 
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